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I. INTRODUCTION
This year, the Ninth Circuit held that a single unsolicited call to a
woman’s cellphone created sufficient harm for her to file suit under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).1 The TCPA, codified in
1991, was initially enacted to prohibit companies from sending
advertisements to potential consumers through their personal facsimile
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Business
Administration, Lees-McRae College, summa cum laude, 2016. My deepest thanks
to Professor Linda Fisher and Jackie Comunale for their guidance and insight during
the drafting of this note.
1
Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2017).
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(“fax”) machines.2 Since then, technology has advanced tremendously,
and while the use of fax advertisements has declined, companies have
looked to emerging technologies to reach customers directly. 3 Text
messages are an appealing medium for such schemes, with six billion text
messages sent daily in 2011, and the average person sending or receiving
thirty-five messages every day.4
In the 2016 case of Spokeo v. Robins,5 the Supreme Court analyzed
the injury requirement for a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970 and held that an injury must be both “particularized” and
“concrete” in order for a plaintiff to have standing to sue. Since the ruling
was passed down, Spokeo has been used by federal Circuit Courts to
analyze other consumer litigation claims.6
Recent TCPA litigation has addressed the issue of whether the harms
being alleged under the Act are “concrete” and “particularized.” 7 This
has been a difficult question the Circuit Courts, who have attempted to
address claims regarding technology that did not exist when the TCPA
was enacted in 1991.8 This unresolved question presents problems for
both businesses and consumers: businesses attempt to market to
consumers through modern technology, while consumers attempt to
preserve their right to privacy.9
In decisions examining the TCPA, both the Third and the Ninth
Circuits found that unwanted messages from businesses constituted
“particularized” and “concrete” harms under Spokeo.10 While this
consumer-friendly approach has been the trend of the Circuit Courts, the
Fourth Circuit took a contrary stance in formulation of the harm
requirement under Spokeo.11
Under the majority interpretation of the Spokeo framework, courts
2
Spencer W. Waller, Daniel B. Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, The Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing
Technology, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 343, 355 (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-178, at
3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1968, 1970).
3
Id. at 395.
4
Marissa A. Potts, “Hello, it’s me [Please don’t sue me!]: Examining the
FCC’s Overbroad Calling Regulations under the TCPA, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 281,
283 (2016).
5
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1542-45 (2016).
6
See, e.g. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.
2017).
7
Id.
8
See, e.g., Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1040.
9
See, e.g., id.
10
Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041; Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346,
352 (3d Cir. 2017).
11
Dreher v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2017).
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have deemed receiving an unsolicited text message to be an injury to a
plaintiff.12 While these rulings have aligned with the legislative intent of
the TCPA, they ignore the realities of the shift in how technology affects
consumers.13 This note will discuss Spokeo, the current split amongst the
nation’s appellate courts over its interpretation, and what should
constitute a litigious injury for TCPA claims.
Section II will discuss the TCPA and explain its intended purpose.
Section III will examine the Spokeo case and discuss the holding’s impact
on the analysis of subsequent TCPA claims. Section IV will discuss how
plaintiffs bring TCPA claims, and specifically, what the injury
requirements are for successful claims. Section V will analyze the circuit
court decisions for consumer protection claims following the Spokeo
ruling. Section VI will examine how the TCPA interpretation has
changed as technology has advanced, and Section VII will apply the
current legal framework to the question of whether a text message should
constitute a concrete injury under the TCPA.
II. TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Prior to the TCPA, Congress had not addressed the new
telecommunications technologies that emerged at the end of the twentieth
century. This lack of regulation left use of such devices unregulated and
prone to abuse by unscrupulous advertisers.14 One prominent marketing
medium among such advertisers was the fax machine.15 Businesses
would gain access to consumers’ numbers and then send promotions,
often unsolicited, through consumers’ fax machines.16 This practice was
inexpensive for companies since their targets, whose ink and toner were
used to print the advertisements, bore most of the financial burden.17
Consumers also faced blocked phone lines and general annoyance, as
they had no control in receiving these advertisements.18
States attempted to regulate these burdensome practices, but
interstate telecommunication structures made the legislation
ineffective.19 In response to states’ demand for federal regulation,
12

Amanda Bronstad, Latest TCPA Decision Eases Path for Consumers,
Deepens Circuit Split, 223 N.J. L. J. 1, 1 (2017).
13
Id.
14
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347.
15
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347.
16
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 354.
17
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 354.
18
Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers”: Striking the Right
Balance in the Private Enforcement of the Anti “Junk Fax” Provisions of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB. L. REV. 70, 78-79 (2011).
19
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347.
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Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in 1991, with
the purpose of “imposing restrictions on the use of telephones for
unsolicited advertising by telephone and fax.”20 The TCPA was a
response to the issue presented by modern consumers’ increasing access
to telecommunication technologies.21 Unlike previous advertising
regulations, which focused on regulating an advertisement’s content, the
TCPA focuses on regulating the medium of advertisement conveyance.22
The TCPA protects consumers from unsolicited advertisements,
which the law defines as “any material advertising the commercial
availability of any property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to
any person without that person’s prior express invitation or
permission.”23 This definition excludes “(A) . . . any person with that
person’s prior express invitation or permission, (B) . . . any person with
whom the caller has an established business relationship, or (C) . . . a tax
exempt nonprofit organization[s].”24
TCPA claims are most commonly enforced in private actions.25 The
Act allows plaintiffs to bring: (1) an action to recover for a monetary loss
from a violation, (2) an action to recover $500 in damages for each such
violation, or both.26 In addition, the court has the discretion to award
punitive damages of up to three times the amount recoverable for
compensatory damages if it finds that the defendant “willfully or
knowingly” violated the TCPA.27 Although it is the most common
method of enforcement, private action is limited in “incentivizing
lawsuits against, and deterring the actions of, intentional violators” of the
Act.28
State governments have the authority to bring civil action under the
TCPA when a company shows a “pattern or practice of violations.”29
State governments have not used this power often, instead relying on
private actions to enforce the TCPA.30 Because TCPA injuries are not
destructive or dangerous, state governments do not prioritize
enforcement.31
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 350.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 350.
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5) (2018).
Id. § 227(a)(4).
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 348.
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2018).
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)-(c) (2018).
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 348.
47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1) (2011).
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 375.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 375.
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The TCPA also permits administrative action against violators of the
statute.32 The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) is the
agency responsible for administrative enforcement.33 The FCC has a
form available on its website for consumers to report TCPA violations.34
Under the Act, “[a]ny person that is determined by the Commission . . .
to have violated [the TCPA] shall be liable to the United States [for a
forfeiture penalty].”35 The FCC is also responsible for prescribing
regulations to implement the statute.36 While the FCC has broad
authority to enforce and interpret the statute, it is limited by the same slow
processing that burdens state enforcement, again leaving a majority of
TCPA enforcement in the hands of private litigants.37
The TCPA has been amended by Congress to cover modern
technologies that emerged after its enactment in 1991. 38 The Ninth
Circuit has deemed the FCC’s interpretation of the phrase “to call” as
“communicat[ing] with a person by telephone” to be reasonable.39 Under
this interpretation, the Act applies to both voice calls and text messages.40
This is consistent with the intended purpose of protecting consumer
privacy, as “a voice or text message [is] not distinguishable in terms of
being an invasion of privacy.”41
III. SPOKEO V. ROBINS
In 2016, a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting Act made its
way to the Supreme Court.42 Defendant operated a company that
provided a database for information about individuals.43 The controversy
arose when the company gave incorrect information about the plaintiff to
a third party.44 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
sufficiency of the injury claimed by the plaintiff. 45 In the context of
Article III standing, the Court held that “a plaintiff’s injury must be both
32

Linetsky, supra note 18, at 79.
Linetsky, supra note 18, at 79.
34
Id. at 80.
35
47 U.S.C. § 227 (e)(5)(A)(i) (2018).
36
Id.
37
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 348.
38
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 367.
39
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 367.
40
Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.
2017) (citing In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14115 (F.C.C. June 26, 2003).
41
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
42
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
43
Id. at 1544.
44
Id.
45
Id.
33
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‘particularized’ and ‘concrete,’ and courts considering the issue must
distinguish between those characteristics in their standing analysis.”46
The Court based its holding on the Constitution, finding “a plaintiff
‘cannot allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.’”47
IV. JURISDICTION FOR TCPA CLAIMS
A. Article III Standing
For a court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present a claim
with standing.48 Standing is the “right to make a legal claim or seek
judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”49 Article III of the United States
Constitution addresses federal court standing, requiring a “case or
controversy” to be established in order for a federal court to have
jurisdiction.50 Article III has three requirements for establishing a “case”
or “controversy”: (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) that was caused by the
defendant, and (3) that is redressable.51 An “injury-in-fact” is defined as
“[a]n actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest, in
contrast to an invasion that is conjectural or hypothetical.”52 If the
defendant caused an injury-in-fact, and the injury is redressable, a federal
court has Article III standing to hear and decide the case.53
In addition to Article III standing, federal courts also require
prudential standing.54 This doctrine specifies that “prudential rules
should govern the determination [of] whether a party should be granted
standing to sue . . . [t]he most important rule [being] that a plaintiff who
asserts an injury must come within the ‘zone of interest’ arguably
protected by the Constitution or a statute.”55 Under the prudentialstanding doctrine, a case with Article III standing may lack federal
jurisdiction if there is no prudential standing.56 This requirement was
46

Id. at 1545.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544, 1549.
48
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49
Priya Khangura, Hurdles to the Court: The Doctrine of Standing Under
Statutory Violations, 11 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 41, 41 (2016)
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
50
Id.
51
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
52
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (Bryan A. Garner ed., Thomson Reuters 5th
Pocket ed. 2016).
53
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
54
Khangura, supra note 49, at 41.
55
Injury-in-Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,
Thomson Reuters 5th Pocket ed. 2016).
56
Id.
47
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enacted to limit the role of courts in areas of public dispute.57
The prudential standing doctrine has two exceptions: (1) the
existence of “countervailing circumstances,” or (2) if Congress grants “an
express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred.”58
However, these exceptions do not apply to the Article III standing
requirements.59 Federal courts require an injury-in-fact to establish
jurisdiction, regardless of whether Congress granted a right of action by
statute.60
B. Harm Requirement
In recent TCPA cases, circuit courts have used the “concrete” and
“particularized” analysis from Spokeo when conducting the standing
analysis.61 Spokeo holds that, for consumer plaintiffs to satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement under Article III, the plaintiff must show an injury is
“concrete and particularized.”62 An injury is “concrete” when it actually
exists, rather than being a mere abstraction.63 However, the injury does
not have to cause a tangible harm.64 For consumer litigation claims, the
harm alleged can be intangible.65 While this does not bar an
establishment of concreteness, a court must determine if an actual harm
has been particularized.66 An injury is “particularized” when it “affects
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” 67 To determine the
sufficiency of an alleged injury, courts follow the two-step inquiry
established in Spokeo.68
The first step to determine sufficiency of an injury is to define the
protected legal interest.69 This can be done by looking to the language
and legislative history of the statute.70 Though statutory intent indicates
a likelihood of recognizable harm, the Spokeo decision affirmed a statute
granting a right to file a claim that does not “automatically satisf[y] the
57

Khangura, supra note 49, at 41 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975)).
58
Khangura, supra note 49, at 41 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).
59
Khangura, supra note 49, at 51.
60
Khangura, supra note 49, at 51.
61
See, e.g. Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 350 (3d Cir. 2017).
62
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (emphasis added).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1549.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Michael G. McLellan, Finding a Leg to Stand on: Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and
Statutory Standing in Consumer Litigation, 31 ANTITRUST ABA 49, 50 (2017).
69
Id.
70
Id.
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injury-in-fact requirement.”71
Once the court establishes a protected legal interest, the analysis
then proceeds to step two: a determination of whether the harm violates
a legally protected interest.72 Justice Alito explained in Spokeo that,
because the analysis is based on historical practices, “it [can be]
instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a
basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”73 A legally protected
interest can also be inferred by looking to the legislature’s intent in
enacting the statute.74
V. CIRCUIT COURT CASES FOLLOWING SPOKEO V. ROBINS
A. Ninth Circuit
i. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness
In 2017, Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness applied the Spokeo analysis
to a TCPA claim.75 The plaintiff filed suit after receiving a series of
promotional texts from Vertical Fitness.76 Vertical Fitness had acquired
a gym of which the plaintiff had previously been a member.77 Though
the plaintiff had only been a member of that gym for three days, the
plaintiff provided his personal information, including his phone number,
when submitting an application.78 Three years after leaving the gym,
Vertical Fitness, which had obtained his number during their acquisition
of the gym, sent the plaintiff promotional text messages.79
In response to the text messages sent by Vertical Fitness, the plaintiff
filed a putative class action under the TCPA.80 His claim alleged Vertical
Fitness had “caus[ed] consumers actual harm” with “the aggravation that
necessarily accompanies wireless spam” along with having to “pay their
cell phone service providers for the receipt of such wireless spam.”81
When the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s standing, it used the
71
72
73
74
75

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
McLellan, supra note 68, at 49.
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
McLellan, supra note 68, at 49.
Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.

2017).
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041.
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standard established in Spokeo.82 In determining if there had been a
concrete harm, the court looked to historically recognized cognizable
harms in English and American courts.83 When Congress enacted the
TCPA, it found that “‘unrestricted telemarketing can be an intrusive
invasion of privacy’ and is a ‘nuisance.’”84 In traditional English and
American law, invasion of privacy and nuisance have been considered
substantial harms, warranting judicial relief.85 The Ninth Circuit found
that unsolicited calls and texts, “by their nature, invade the privacy and
disturb the solitude of recipients.”86 Because the harm addressed by the
TCPA had historically been recognized by the courts, the Ninth Circuit
held the text messages were a concrete and particularized harm that
entitled the plaintiff to both Article III and prudential standing.87
B. Third Circuit
i. Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc.
In Sussino, the Third Circuit considered the harm requirement for a
TCPA claim.88 The plaintiff’s claim in the case centered around a single
unsolicited call to her cellphone from defendant Work Out World, Inc.
(“WOW”).89 The plaintiff alleged harm derived from a one-minute,
prerecorded promotional message left on the plaintiff’s voicemail by
WOW.90 In opposition to the claim, WOW asserted that “the structure of
[the TCPA provision] limits the scope of ‘cellular telephone services’ to
when ‘the called party is charged for the call.’”91 Citing the Second
Restatement of Torts, WOW argued that “‘two or three’ calls would not
be considered ‘highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person],’ thus
leaving no injury-in-fact for the plaintiff to assert.”92
Susinno examined whether the TCPA prohibited the defendant’s
conduct, and if so, whether the harm would be sufficiently concrete and
particularized to establish Article III and prudential standing. 93 After

82

Id.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1540 (2016).
84
Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 348.
91
Id. at 349.
92
Id. at 351-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1977)).
93
Id. at 348.
83
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concluding the TCPA did apply, the Third Circuit analyzed the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s standing under the Spokeo framework.94 The
court interpreted Spokeo as a “reiteration [of] traditional notions of
standing,” specifically noting the traditional principle that “the mere
technical violation of a procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and
of itself, constitute an injury-in-fact.”95
In applying the Spokeo standard, the court looked to determine
whether there was a congressionally defined injury. 96 The TCPA applies
“directly to single recorded calls from cell phones,” and in enacting the
statute, Congress focused on protecting consumers’ privacy interests.97
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged harm in the form of a “nuisance and
invasion of privacy.”98 The court agreed, concluding that the claim was
the kind Congress intended to address in enacting the TCPA.99
In addition to asserting a congressionally-identified harm, Spokeo
also requires that the plaintiff show that such harm be concrete and
particularized.100 To determine if the harm was concrete, the Third
Circuit looked to historical tradition of both English and American courts
to determine if the harm was recognized.101 In conducting such a
historical analysis, a court must determine whether “newly established
causes of action protect essentially the same interests that traditional
causes of action sought to protect.”102 In Sussino, the Third Circuit found
TCPA claims alleging an “invasion[] of privacy, intrusion upon
seclusion, and nuisance” have historically been heard in American
courts.103
By enacting the statute, Congress “‘elevat[ed] a harm that, while
previously inadequate in the law,’ was of the same character of previously
existing ‘legally cognizable injuries.’”104 Because Congress elevated the
injury, instead of creating a new kind of injury, the Court determined the
harm was sufficient to establish Article III standing.105 Under this
interpretation, the Third Circuit determined that a single one-minute
94

Susinno, 862 F.3d. at 350.
Id. at 350, 352.
96
Id. at 351.
97
Id. at 351 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C)).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016).
101
Susinno, 862 F.3d at 350-51.
102
Id. at 351.
103
Id. (quoting Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037, 1043
(9th Cir. 2017)).
104
Id. at 352.
105
Id.
95
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voicemail was sufficient to confer standing before a federal court.106
ii. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig.
In the Third Circuit case, In re Horizon, the court analyzed the harm
requirement for consumer litigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”).107 The defendant, Horizon, owned laptops that contained the
plaintiffs’ personal information.108 When those laptops were stolen, the
plaintiffs sued the defendants, even though nothing had been done with
the stolen information to injure the plaintiffs. 109 The District Court found
the plaintiffs did not have standing because “none of them had adequately
alleged that the information was actually used to their detriment;”
therefore, there was no injury-in-fact.110
In In re Horizon, Judge Jordan of the Third Circuit focused on the
merit of the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant caused an injury by
“‘plac[ing] [them] at an imminent, immediate, and continuing increased
risk of harm from identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud . . . ‘“111
In making its determination, the Third Circuit first looked to historical
precedent, and found there was evidence that “Congress may enact
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even
though no injury would exist without the statute.”112
Previous Third Circuit opinions analyzing the sufficiency of a
statutory harm for conferring Article III standing were somewhat
inconsistent.113 The Third Circuit reiterated their own precedent, stating
that, “[t]he proper analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff
suffered an actual injury, not on whether a statute was violated.”114 This
contradicts many of the previous district court decisions within the
circuit, which had allowed statutory violations to constitute a cognizable
injury, without considering if there was an actual harm.115
To resolve the discrepancy within the Third Circuit, the Court
looked to Spokeo.116 The Circuit Court interpreted Spokeo to mean that
“Congress ‘has the power to define injuries . . . that were previously
106

Id.
In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629 (3d
Cir. 2017).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 634 (citation omitted)
112
Id. at 635 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
113
In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 635.
114
Id. at 635 n.14.
115
Id. at 635.
116
Id.
107
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inadequate in law.’”117 Under this interpretation, legislatures can “elevate
intangible harms into concrete harms.”118
When applying Spokeo, the Third Circuit determined that the facts
of the current case did not require the “consider[ation] [of] the full reach
of congressional power to elevate a procedural violation into an injury in
fact” as “this case [did] not strain that reach.”119 Instead, the court
determined that case law and common law allowed protection for the
plaintiffs’ right to privacy, and that “with privacy torts, improper
dissemination of information can itself constitute a cognizable injury.” 120
While the court conceded this alone may not have been sufficient to
confer Article III standing, “with the passage of the FCRA, Congress
established that the unauthorized dissemination of personal information
by a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself,” and through
its enactment of the FCRA, Congress had shown that it “believed that the
violation of the FCRA causes a concrete harm to consumers.”121 The
Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient injury
that was not a “mere technical or procedural violation of the FCRA,” and
remanded the plaintiffs’ case so it could proceed to litigation.122
C. Fourth Circuit
i. Dreher v. Experion Info. Solutions
Dreher v. Experion Info. Solutions stands out as one of the most
defendant-friendly decision amongst the consumer protection cases that
have had standing which the Spokeo framework analyzed.123 While
Dreher was brought under the FCRA, it is significant for its analysis of
the concrete and particularized aspect of the alleged injury-in-fact.124
The controversy involved a 69,000-member class action, initiated by
Dreher, against Experion.125 Dreher, while undergoing a background
check for a security clearance with the federal government, found a
delinquent credit card account on his credit report.126 Dreher attempted
to contact the company associated with the card to fix the mistake.127 The
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at 638.
Id.
In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638.
Id. at 638-39.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
Bronstad, supra note 12.
Dreher v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fact that the company associated with the delinquent card had closed
during the 2008 financial crisis was not indicated on the credit report.128
The portfolio of that company had been given to another company and
was then assigned to CardWorks, Inc. and CardWorks Servicing L.L.C
(collectively, “CardWorks”).129 Experion chose not to change the name
of the company on the plaintiffs’ credit reports to comply with historic
practices and prevent consumer confusion.130 Dreher brought the class
action to federal court, where he argued Experian’s failure to change the
name of the company listed on his credit report caused an informational
injury.131
At trial, Experian argued the plaintiff lacked Article III standing.132
The district court rejected Experian’s argument, finding “the FCRA
‘creates a statutory right to receive the “sources of information” for one’s
credit report,’” which created an injury-in-fact sufficient to meet the
burden of establishing Article III standing.133 During the district court
trial, held before Spokeo was decided; the “concrete” and “particularized”
requirements outlined in Spokeo were not considered.134
Because of the anticipated significance of Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit
held Dreher in abeyance until the decision was announced.135 Using
Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s claim that he had
suffered an injury-in-fact, “because he was denied ‘specific information
to which [he] w[as] entitled under the FCRA.”‘136 The Court found the
harm claimed by the plaintiff was not concrete; and therefore, there was
no Article III standing.137
The plaintiff attempted to establish concreteness by arguing the
harm he suffered was “a ‘real’ harm with adverse effect.’”138 The Fourth
Circuit rejected the contention, finding Dreher was alleging a pure
statutory violation, with very little injury to himself. 139 The most
significant injury the plaintiff alleged was Experian’s failure to comply
with the FCRA threatened his security clearance with the federal

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 341.
Id.
Dreher, 856 F.3d at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Dreher, 856 F.3d at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 346.
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government.140 The court found, however, that while an actual harm to
his security clearance would constitute an injury sufficient to establish
Article III standing, Dreher’s security clearance was not affected by
Experian’s policy, meaning there was “no real world harm on Dreher.”141
Because the court found Dreher did not have an injury-in-fact sufficient
to establish Article III standing, the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.142
VI. INTERPRETING MODERN TCPA CLAIMS
In 1991, one of the leading harms Congress sought to prevent by
enacting the TCPA was abuse of consumers’ fax machines for unsolicited
promotional purposes.143 The abuse of this practice led to usage of
consumers’ tangible resources, including paper, ink, and toner, as well as
tying-up landlines and being a general nuisance.144 Customers receiving
promotional faxes often had little control in the faxes being sent, and even
if they were given the option to opt-out, it was not until after the advertiser
had already used the consumer’s resources.145
Today, cell phones have changed the landscape of TCPA
enforcement. Studies show that where once having a home phone was a
staple of American households, the trend today is for people to disconnect
their home phones and rely exclusively on cell phones.146 As more people
rely on cellphones, advertisers having access to consumers through their
phones may cause increasingly detrimental effects. 147 If the proper
regulations are not in place, advertisers can establish more invasive
telemarketing practices to access to consumers.148
Following Spokeo, most appellate courts have found a phone call
constitutes a concrete and particularized harm that can withstand scrutiny
under the Spokeo standard.149 These findings are based on the idea that
the violation of the statute demonstrates a concrete injury, and that an
invasion of privacy is a legally protected interest.150 An argument that
supports this interpretation is that, even with modern technology, the cost

140
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142
143
144
145
146
147
148
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Id.
Dreher, 856 F.3d at 347.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 347.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 354.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 357.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 384.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 387.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 387.
Bronstad, supra note 12, at 12. See also McLellan, supra note 68, at 53.
McLellan, supra note 68, at 53.
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of advertising is shifted to the consumer.151 This shifting in cost is
especially detrimental to the twenty-three percent of all wireless
subscribers who have prepaid cellphone plans.152
Most courts uphold a plaintiff’s claim of harm under the TCPA
under the justification that the harm alleged is rooted in common law.153
As suggested in Spokeo, when the concrete and particularized harm
element is uncertain, it can be helpful to look to traditional English and
American law.154 American common law has long recognized a right
against “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.”155 Since
the Congressional intent in enacting the TCPA was in part to protect the
privacy interests of consumers, circuit courts have rationally concluded
that the harm is concrete and particularized, and thus sufficient to
establish Article III standing.156
Consumers can still be harmed if advertisers are allowed to send
promotional text messages, even with opt-out options.157 When
consumers respond to a promotional text message to opt-out of receiving
future messages, the advertiser has confirmation that they have reached
an active cell phone number.158 These entities can then sell that
information to others, putting consumers at risk for continued privacy
invasion.159
Additionally, advertisers can include links that may lead consumers
to accidentally sign up for services through the same messages offering
the opt-out option.160 The prevalence of cellphone use, as well as the
savviness of advertisers, can put consumers at risk for prolonged and
unwanted invasions of privacy.
Though the TCPA was enacted to protect consumers from predatory
businesses, businesses themselves are at risk if the TCPA is too broadly
interpreted. This is especially true for small businesses, which often form
marketing plans without knowledge of the extent of the TCPA or the
ramifications for violating the TCPA.161 Businesses are facing confusion
as a result of inconsistent enforcement of the TCPA. 162 This is further
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 366.
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2, at 366.
McLellan, supra note 68, at 53.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
McLellan, supra note 68, at 53.
See, e.g., Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017).
Waller, Heidtke, & Stewart, supra note 2, at 396.
Waller, Heidtke, & Stewart, supra note 2, at 396.
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complicated for the businesses operating across state lines. With varying
interpretations of the TCPA amongst federal and state jurisdictions, it can
be difficult for companies to know if a marketing strategy will lead to a
TCPA violation.163 This inconsistency increases the likelihood a business
will accidentally violate the TCPA. Under a broad interpretation of harm,
these companies may be found liable, irrespective of the business’ lack
of intent. Congress’ goal in enacting the TCPA was to punish “malicious
and intentional violators,” therefore, businesses may be unduly harmed
under the current trend of interpretation.164
Additionally, common payment plans that consumers subscribe to
for text messaging allows them to send and receive unlimited messages
for a fixed price.165 Customers with this type of plan pay the same amount
for text messages, regardless of whether the message is promotional.166
When consumers brought the initial TCPA claims in 1991, they were able
to show a financial detriment in receiving unwanted fax
correspondences.167 For consumers today, receiving a text message does
not involve the same detriments the TCPA was enacted to prevent. The
discrepancy between the amount of harm demonstrated by the initial
claims and claims filed today is rarely considered. It should be further
analyzed by the legislature and the FCC to determine if current TCPA
claims warrant the same degree of protection granted for consumers in
1991.
VII. IS A TEXT MESSAGE AN INJURY?
As telecommunications technology has advanced, courts have
attempted to interpret legislation that was enacted before the
commonplace technology used today existed.168 The prevalence of text
messaging has led to businesses using it for marketing. 169 As explained
previously, the TCPA has been interpreted to govern text messages.170
Because of this, claims are beginning to arise under the TCPA alleging
163

Linetsky, supra note 18, at 74.
Potts, supra note 4, at 284.
165
Shannon, Victoria, 15 Years of Text Messages, ‘A Cultural Phenomenon’,
THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/technology/
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166
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167
See Waller, Heidtke, & Stewart, supra note 2, at 354.
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See, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.
2017).
169
See, e.g., Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017).
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In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 (July 3, 2003).
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that promotional text messages from companies amount to sufficient
harm to confer Article III standing.171
When Spokeo was released, it applied to a wide variety of consumer
litigation claims, including TCPA claims, to aid courts in determining if
the injuries alleged were sufficient to support Article III standing. 172
After the Susinno decision held that a single unsolicited phone call was
sufficient to confer Article III standing, some legal scholars, including
Amanda Bronstad, opined that the TCPA was being interpreted in a
consumer friendly fashion, with a decidedly broad interpretation of what
could constitute harm.173
As previously noted, text messaging has taken up prominence in
today’s society. For businesses, it is an efficient and inexpensive method
to market products and services, and has the ability to reach a large
population over various demographics.174 For consumers, however,
receiving text messages from businesses can feel like an invasion; and
along with being a nuisance, it can lead to accidental purchases if
businesses send misleading promotions.175
As of now, one case alleging an injury by way of text message has
made it to the Circuit Court level.176 While that case found that the text
message was not sufficient to confer an injury, an analysis of similar
cases shows that other courts would find a text message a sufficient injury
to confer Article III standing.177 Because of the influence text messaging
has on today’s society, it is imperative to consider its effects because (1)
businesses should be aware of the extent they can use text messages as a
promotional devise; (2) consumers who are truly being harmed by a
business’s promotional tactics should be able to find recourse; and (3)
consumers should be made aware of their rights so businesses cannot
evade liability just because the injury is relatively minor.
Additionally, it is important that higher federal courts reach a
consensus on this issue because text messaging allows businesses to reach
consumers across a wide range of jurisdictions. Consistency in judicial
interpretation will allow companies to better comply with the law.
A. Spokeo Analysis
The Spokeo analysis has been important for determining the injury
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Van Patten, 847 F.3d 1037.
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requirement of consumer protection claims and is therefore important for
determining if a text message is a sufficient injury for TCPA claims.
Courts following Spokeo have used it to determine if injuries alleged by
plaintiffs are “concrete and particularized.”178 Justice Alito defined a
particularized injury as one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way.”179 The Court defines a “concrete” injury as one that is
real as opposed to abstract.180 The opinion in Spokeo specifically
differentiates these two terms and requires that both be met to confer
standing.181 Without an “appreciat[ion] [for] the distinction between
concreteness and particularization,” a court’s standing analysis is
incomplete.182
i. Concreteness
Using the Spokeo analysis, a single unsolicited text message from a
business can constitute a concrete injury. An injury is concrete if “it . . .
actually exist[s]” or is de facto.183 In Spokeo, the Court specifically states
that tangibility is not a requirement for a concrete injury.184
When analyzing whether an intangible harm constitutes a concrete
injury, Justice Alito points to an analysis of “history and the judgment of
Congress.”185 Historical practices are useful because an “intangible harm
[that] has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English and American
courts” is more likely to constitute a sufficient concrete injury against a
plaintiff.186 Legislative Acts are important because (1) the legislature is
in a “position[] to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article
III requirements” and (2) “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate at law.”187 Though a legislative act may be indicative of a
concrete injury, it is not conclusive.188 It would be considered insufficient
for a plaintiff to allege a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any
178
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concrete harm . . . .”189
In Susinno, the court noted that an injury is concrete when the
plaintiff “sues under a statute alleging ‘the very injury [the statute] is
intended to prevent,’ and the injury ‘has a close relationship to a harm . . .
traditionally . . . providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American
courts . . . .”190 When applying this to the plaintiff’s claim regarding a
single phone call from the defendant, the court noted that (1) Congress
had identified the injury that it was attempting to protect plaintiffs from,
and (2) “TCPA claims closely relate to traditional claims for ‘invasions
of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance [which] have long
been heard by American courts.’”191 It was based on this analysis that
the court found the plaintiff had alleged a concrete injury. 192
Based on the Spokeo analysis and the subsequent analysis of
“concreteness” in the circuit cases that followed, it seems likely that
sending an unsolicited text message constitutes a concrete injury. The
TCPA has been construed to apply to text messages.193 The intent of
Congress in enacting the TCPA was to “protect the privacy interests of
residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited,
automated telephone calls . . . .”194 Protection of a consumer’s privacy
by businesses wanting to send unsolicited promotional text messages
would fit into the legislative intent.
Additionally, as referenced in Susinno, TCPA claims are rooted in
the common law protection of privacy, intrusion of seclusion, and
nuisance.195 Based on both the legislation’s aim to protect the consumer’s
privacy interest as well as the common law’s interest in protecting similar
interests, an unsolicited text message would constitute a harm to a
plaintiff.
ii. Particularized
If a plaintiff were to receive a text message and file suit in response
to that text message, it would constitute a particularized injury. A
particularized injury is one that affects the plaintiff as an individual.196
189
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The plaintiff argued in Spokeo that the defendant had “violated his
statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and that his,
“interests . . . [were] individualized rather than collective.”197
If a plaintiff is filing suit in response to receiving a text message,
then that person’s statutory rights under the TCPA have been allegedly
violated. This is sufficient to confer a particularized injury.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While it may seem outlandish given the proclivity of text messages
and the lack of significant harm, the law as it stands today, when
considering both the TCPA and Spokeo, allows plaintiffs to sue for the
receipt of an unsolicited text message.
While general standing may be conferred, other issues should factor
into the allowance of litigation on the grounds of a text message, such as
prudential standing and implied consent by consumers. There should also
be a consideration of the logic in allowing such litigation to commence
on the basis of the TCPA. When the TCPA was enacted, consumers were
facing abuses by businesses that resulted in a nuisance, a waste of
consumer’s resources, and potential inability of consumers to use their
fax machines. In comparison, the detriment of receiving a text message
is arguably minor. Consumers are often able to block numbers they no
longer wish to receive calls or messages from. Additionally, single text
messages are inexpensive, and for many, come as part of a plan that
makes it so the consumer does not spend additional money for receipt of
that message. Further, when a text message is received, it seems unlikely
that the phone will be unable to function as the consumer wishes it to for
any significant amount of time.
That being said, it is well recognized that consumers have a right to
privacy and the U.S. legal system has recognized that right as
telecommunication technologies have advanced. While technology was
once limited in location, today, cell phones allow consumers to have their
mobile devices almost anywhere, making it so messaging from an
unsolicited caller is arguably more intrusive than ever before.
Additionally, given the wide variety of cellphone plans offered, many
consumers still face a financial burden, especially if businesses malicious
and abusive promotional strategies.
Ultimately, businesses should be able to formulate a clear marketing
plan, without fear of inadvertently intruding on the rights of consumers,
and consumers should have the right to protect their privacy. As it stands,
the TCPA is outdated. When the TCPA was enacted in 1991, text
197
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messaging was not yet in existence, but today accounts for a substantial
part of many people’s lives. Even given its importance, Congress has yet
to pass specific legislation to address the duties and rights of businesses
and consumers in regards to promotional text messages.
To better accommodate both businesses and consumer’s interests,
new legislation should be considered to address the role of text messages
in advertising. By conducting their own research and considering the
voice of the people, Congress is in the best position to determine when
there should be standing for a single text message. Until then, under
Spokeo, plaintiffs will be injured by receiving a text message.

